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Old 22nd Feb 2021, 14:18
  #650 (permalink)  
safetypee
 
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Willow ‘… have there been significant changes in the way Propulsion System Malfunctions present themselves as occurrences to flight crews for response?
Not fundamentally from a technical viewpoint; noting that this accident appears more related to an automatic control system and not the engines themselves.

lomapaseo provides an excellent summary ‘nice to know if you have the time’.
Whilst the review had a common objective - improved safety, the processes of achieving this depended on the stake-holder viewpoint.

The FAA - safety by regulation, was satisfied by having the review and report.
Operators - safety by doing, would meet requirements by having the report for reference (but not mandated), - then placed on the shelf alongside the Wind-shear Training Aid, CFIT, and RTO training aids.
Each agency influenced by a common factor - cost / time benefit; ‘we are safe enough, someone else's problem’. Added to which was the underlying belief that the problem was a training issue, and then because training was already conducted it was good enough.

Although most aircraft systems have evolved, the human contribution appears static. In regulation - a belief that the human element can be regulated; and in operation - that the human can be trained to conform. Both views assuming that the situations and human reactions will be as imagined, as regulated, as trained for.

These issues are not a normal management problem where a solution can be found. Aviation is a ‘complex adaptive system’ (anything which involves humans) without specific solution for perceived ‘issues’.
Perhaps a range of small adjustments seeking small improvement, but not to disturb the current high level of safety, nor introduce new hazards.

Change is required in the manner which the industry views incidents, questions assumptions, and uses the valued human resource.
One approach would require proactive reductions in exposure to hazardous situations, but the inability to foresee every situation still requires reactive ability to manage unknown outcomes. Yet again being unable to foresee or constrain outcome, crews require abilities to mange the uncertainties of the situation, which starts with situation awareness and making sense of these (airmanship, expertise.

Last edited by safetypee; 22nd Feb 2021 at 18:10. Reason: Typo
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