andrasz, previously:-
‘…
something seriously askew with the pilot who failed to monitor the developing upset‘
Concluding pilot ’failure’ without further justification adds nothing to a safety debate.
This event appears to been preceded by one or more flights which involved engine / auto-throttle malfunction, those crews managed the flight safely; how, why.
A more valued view of human performance contributions to safety is to consider why the previous crews succeeded in their monitoring, awareness, understanding, and acting, in apparently similar conditions.
A natural tendency is to start with the human; ok, but view the human as an asset.
Then consider the situation; similar conditions, but not necessarily the same situation.
Look for differences; perhaps an intermediate level off with higher thrust levels vs previous climb to cruise altitude. The crew interaction with the situation; distraction, focus of attention, ATC, …
This is normal operation, not seriously askew.
Insisting otherwise could indicate that our thinking and reasoning is serious askew, individual skew, ‘i-skew’.
For a systems approach to help understand this event, and as a human performance refresher, see in a recent publication sections 1.3 and 1.4 in
https://www.easa.europa.eu/community...Regulators.pdf
P.S. ‘…
some are more capable of handling this than others, the rule of averages as had been discussed before …‘ not the magenta line, but children of Lake Wobgone.