Human performance is a spectrum; any training program necessarily makes a determination of the prerequisites to the training. In the middle of all that is the individual's awareness of their state in the universe. Then the individual gets to interact with operational realities, variables that involve anomalies, distractions, and pressures. Within that environment, when events go awry, observers get an opportunity to make commentary on the competency of the individual's performance. Since 1970, BAAA records indicate 11,170 commercial aircraft accidents where the aircraft was written off, where the system didn't work out well. Of those, fatal accidents are a subset. A percentage of these had no human causation at the operational end of the process, with design, manufacture, environmental and unlawful actions being the stated primary cause, arising from the industry state of the art. Yet, the human is also the means by which anomalies that were not or could not be foreseen are successfully surmounted.
Part 25 doesn't assume that the aircraft will go sideways undetected to the extent that the roll authority of the AFCS will be exceeded. Yet with a B74SP at 41,000' that occurs, and in that case, 3 professionally trained, qualified crew watch a plane decelerate and stall with power asymmetry, without rudder application, and during the ensuing gyrations, the crew's concern is that the problem is... an Attitude failure, while 3 ADI's 2 HSI's 2 RMIs all agree with the instruments. Strong plane.
Out of Jakarta, this aircraft had a minor anomaly that results in a LOC-I event that is not recovered from. The fundamental problem is not one of the training techniques for recovery (although that would be handy to have), the issue appears to be the failure to detect that an anomaly exists, which gets back to the failure of SA. If the crew does not recognize what has happened, then the recovery techniques are moot.
Last edited by fdr; 21st Feb 2021 at 02:18.