Originally Posted by
Two's in
Shouldn't have been. This was only 1:50 in the mission and the report says they were compliant with crew duty and rest period.
They ended up dual engine out because they shut down the wrong engine. That is indisputable. There isn't a single flight safety course that doesn't hammer home the "Kegworth" effect of startle reflex and response, the situation seems bad and disorienting, but if you act suddenly and reflexively, you may just make it as lot worse, as happened here. There have also been a multitude of accidents where EICAS messages are misleading or plain wrong following some major malfunction. There were other primary displays of engine condition, Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) and Inter Turbine Temperature (ITT), and the digital readouts of Fuel Flow (FF), N2 (RPM core), and oil pressure to allow some element of cross checking to take place before touching any of the throttles. Not diverting into the nearest field with 40K of altitude is almost understandable, but not once it became a dual engine out situation.
It's not a blame game at this stage, it's all about understanding how you aren't going to make those same mistakes
I believe we’re all compelled to take way something that we can incorporate into our own operations. For me, above and beyond the drills of handling a failure, it’s that time is on your side with a failure when it occurs at mid/high altitudes. Commence the immediate action item/QRH, etc only when your ready and sure of what your facing.