Originally Posted by
The AvgasDinosaur
Not wishing to compromise OPSEC or criticise the crew but could mission endurance and crew fatigue be a significant factor in misidentification of engine failure?
They could be, but emergency handling SOPs in a multi-pilot operation should address those factors by incorporating checks and cross-checks, just as we would expect an airline crew to handle an engine failure at the end of a 12-hour night flight.
Another factor is that the BACN sortie profile is probably the most boring kind of flying possible and under-arousal is known to increase the risk of an inappropriate reaction to a sudden event. Mitigating this requires frequent rotation of crews in and out of theatre for simulator training and mentally rehearsing contingencies during sorties. Or, preferably to my mind, using drones.
Originally Posted by JTO
I find the repeated suggestions that the crew should have remained within parameters for a dead-stick landing a bit of a stretch. If the USAF really thinks that is a viable option on a big, swept-wing ETOPS jet then perhaps they should have such thoughts before an accident rather than expecting a crew to imagineer their way into one during the noise, vibration and confusing instrumentation of the mishap sequence.
I sympathise with this analysis, but the attempt to return to Kandahar from near-overhead Kabul in these circumstances does rather suggest that the crew was not calmly and rationally assessing their situation.