Warning update: Egypt’s Libya threat risks larger Mediterranean war
................Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sisi
stated on June 20 that Egypt has a legitimate right to intervene in Libya and ordered the Egyptian military to be prepared to do so. Sisi declared the current front line, which lies west of Sirte and Jufra in central Libya, a “red line” in a bid to preserve his Libyan ally’s control of a critical oil-producing region.
Sisi’s threat is an attempt to preserve leverage and secure Egyptian interests after a change in the balance of power in Libya the past month. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Russia had backed Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar in an attempt to seize Libya’s capital Tripoli starting in April 2019.
Turkey intervened in January 2020 on behalf of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and stalled the LNA advance. Turkish military support then helped GNA-aligned forces
turn the tide. Haftar’s forces withdrew from the Tripoli front in early June, ending the 13-month effort to seize the capital.
Sisi convened eastern Libyan leaders, including Haftar, to announce a uni-lateral ceasefire on June 6. Sisi’s June 20 assertion that an Egyptian intervention would be legitimate is based on the claim that it would be enforcing a cease-fire.
Sisi seeks to hold the line at Sirte and Jufra to prevent a Turkish-backed advance into the oil crescent region, which Haftar’s forces seized in September 2016. Sisi’s June 20 threat was likely triggered by a Turkish
statement earlier that same day that a cease-fire would be possible only if LNA forces returned to their 2015 positions—meaning withdrawing from Sirte and ceding control of oil infrastructure.
Losing the oil crescent would severely degrade Haftar’s already shaky position and would weaken other political and tribal leaders through whom Cairo exerts influence. Jufra district is critical as the LNA’s westernmost military position used to support defending Sirte and pressuring Misrata, a key hub for GNA-aligned militias in the northwest. Jufra airbase also houses Russian mercenaries and aircraft that support the LNA.
GNA consolidation of the line the Turks propose would give the GNA control over the bulk of Libya’s oil infrastructure, removing a key point of leverage that Haftar has used to shape negotiations. Such an advance would severely limit the LNA’s ability to strike into western Libya while allowing GNA-aligned forces to pressure LNA power centers directly, reversing the westward trajectory of the Libya conflict since 2014............
The situation on the ground is tense. GNA-aligned forces are preparing to launch an offensive on Sirte, and LNA forces have announced
a no-fly zone and the *deployment
of reinforcements in response. Russian mercenaries have begun flying combat aircraft sorties out of Jufra airbase, according to satellite imagery released by US Africa Command (AFRICOM) on June 18.
Egypt had begun to build up additional materiel at al Salloum on the Libyan-Egyptian border as of June 8. There are unconfirmed reports
of Egyptian and possibly Emirati aircraft in Libyan airspace as of June 22.
What comes next?
Egyptian leaders likely seek to avoid a full-fledged intervention in Libya, particularly as Egypt faces multiple serious challenges that include rising tensions with Ethiopia over its Nile dam, the ongoing counter-insurgency against Islamic State militants in the Sinai Peninsula, and the economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The most likely scenario is an Egyptian show of force to persuade Turkey to scale back its support and limit the advance of its Libyan partners, who are reliant on Turkish drones and air defense assets. This scenario would freeze the conflict around the current front line, allowing for a temporary reduction in tensions..........
A worst-case scenario is possible in the near term if key players miscalculate. Egypt, the UAE, and Russia appear to have misjudged Turkey’s willingness to commit assets to Libya. A similar miscalculation could prove disastrous in the current combustible environment. Should Turkey overreach and seek to call Egypt’s bluff by supporting an invasion of the oil crescent, it could incite an unexpected retaliation from Cairo.
Such a direct conflict remains unlikely, but it is an extremely dangerous possibility with regional implications that could be set off by mistakes or miscalculations in an already fraught environment.........