The debate seems to be becoming rather over simplified and binary if I may say, but to continue in similar vein, Bomber command did what it could and what it was ordered to do.
What it could do changed during the course of the war: at the start, it could barely hit the proverbial barn door , day or night. As equipment, technology, and of course experience developed, there evolved some extraordinary capability, of which the Dambusters raid stands out. We can debate the long term impact of it on the German war effort, but as a bit of bomb tossing it remains exceptional.
As for what Bomber Command was ordered to do, that also developed during the war. From dropping propaganda leaflets through to 1000 bomber raids. In the beginning, its mission was little more than "hitting back" when we had few other means at our disposal to do so, and as much for national morale rather than substantive military objectives.
Prompted by what we now know to be the inadvertent dropping of bombs on London by a single aircraft, Churchill ordered a raid on Berlin, again for symbolic rather than substantive purposes. The rest we know. Whilst we did persist with military targets, area bombing didnt take long to emerge and eventually dominate Bomber Command activities. Agree or disagree with it, it was considered a legitimate tactic at the time in the context of "total war" although it was not aimed at achieving superiority over the Luftwaffe, albeit a diminution of the Luftwaffes offensive capabilities would have seemed a likely by product.
In my view, Bomber Commands post war "image" problems start and finish with Harris. A very difficult guy to like at the best of times apparently, he was a devout believer in area bombing, and persisted with it after it was clear that there were better targets available which would have had a more direct bearing on the end of the war. It has been suggested that he refused to countenance a shift from area bombing to attacking oil refining capacity, up to and including refusing direct orders to do so. That he was not removed was testament to his status within public opinion and Churchills direct intervention.
This was not forgotten post war, and the ensuing "snubbing" of Bomber Command" was in my view simply a snubbing of Harris. The subsequent revisitation of the morality of area bombing with the benefit of hindsight, detailed accounts of what it was like to experience it, and evidence of its limited effects on morale have simply added fuel to the fire. Grossly unfair to those who served in Bomber Command, and even, to a degree, to Harris