Replying to H. Peacock's...
It wasn't clear in those EFATO practices how the departure was conducted and if there was a consideration of turning crosswind early to significantly reduce the amount of turn necessary to RTF after a power loss. I know that amount of bank and speed affect safety in such a low level turn, but I'd like to hear opinions on that. I think I saw something there which might have been a practice of turning crosswind, likely at 500, to better position for a failure, then when high enough, turn right to parallel a straight out if the intended direction of flight intended that. Have I correctly read that. It seems like good practice in any single engine.
Somewhat a different scenario, but in the no ejection seat world, and without the height to return to field, straight out is the only option. That often doesn't present favorable outcomes. Complicated by the impression of disaster, which can reduce performance and be self fulfilling. I have a long time friend I worked with who went on to be a very experienced TSB investigator. His view was that if you landed a powerless aircraft wings level, in the landing attitude (flare), at flare speed, and you had 25 feet or more to decelerate, you were very likely to walk away with minimal or no injuries. Obviously that applies to light single engine aircraft and stall speeds of such aircraft. Not a comment directed at you military guys, but more for people likely to be flying singles.
In Peacock's post, he/she mentions students chancing the turn back rather than the immediate eject to see how it goes. Retired BA holds that this is what happened. In this, not a student, but a very accomplished aviator. If so, that may be because the pilot felt it could be safely done and there was no need to eject. Fair enough. But surely every Tutor pilot would have it in their mind that a successful low level eject six months before in Atlanta required the pilot to overcome "...anomalies in the ejection sequence". Might that effect the outcome of almost instantaneous choices of options in these circumstances? Perhaps some of the RCAF people, Cold Lake or elsewhere, can say what those anomalies were, whether they were a once off, or whether there is something that hasn't yet been resolved. Not to say that the Tutors just kept on flying, but not resolved in the minds of pilots when they think of the Atlanta pilot's experience and having that experience themselves.