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Old 14th Apr 2020, 07:33
  #38 (permalink)  
tucumseh
 
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: uk
Posts: 3,225
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If I may:

ancientaviator62 - From memory, MoD denied having the report. It was sought by another ppruner who was directly involved in the XV179 Inquest. Like other Coroners, Mr Masters wasn't amused when the public provided copies of documents MoD denied the existence of. MoD also denied the CONTENT of the CHART (Chinook/Puma/Wessex) report, claiming only 53 pages existed (which had been withheld from Inquiries). The author came forward with just under 400, plus early drafts and covering letters proving who'd seen it. Lord Philip was not amused. MoD then maintained the lie to Ministers, and Dr Fox misled parliament. He was later forced to retract, but did not apologise in the House. Similarly, MoD stated to a Mull of Kintyre widow that there was no such thing as Releases to Service in 1994 - that it was Controller Aircraft who signed the only release. The Air Staff copy of the Chinook Mk2 RTS was sent to Lord Philip. Again, not amused. Things like that win cases.

Edit: You are right about restrictive TORs (set by the RAF Chief Engineer). He also delayed CHART in 1992, specifically prohibiting the team leader from speaking to MoD's airworthiness specialists or Fleetlands, who were preparing Mk1s for induction. You may recall that he (Alcock) and CAS (Graydon) denied CHART or its TORs mentioned the Mk2, again repeated by Ministers. It was referred to 373 times, and when the TORs were later uncovered they revealed, at para 4(f), a directive to address the Mid Life Upgrade. The Director of Flight Safety reported the failure of Configuration Control (a major component of airworthiness, and a pre-requisite to a valid safety case), and that it must be regained for the 'Mk2'. In 1999, the Chief of Defence Procurement confirmed to the Public Accounts Committee that the situation remained, although omitted that this had been RAF policy since 1991. Something he had known since at least June 1996. I couldn't possibly comment on why he withheld this, but revealing it would have destroyed the RAF's case against the Mull pilots.

Rigga - There may be a fourth part to the trilogy. Viruses permitting.

B Word - While you are of course correct about many other users, the issue with MoD is that it flatly refuses to learn lessons or, in many cases, implement recommendations from previous fatal accidents. Seven years after Sean Cunningham died, 12 of the recommendations, which MoD claimed in 2014 to be addressing, were factors in Jonathan Bayliss's death. Most, if not all, were mandated anyway. And most of the Cunningham ones were repeated from previous accidents. For example, the main failure (not conducting disturbed systems testing) repeated that of the Simon Burgess case in 1996. It is the alarming number of recurrences that is the problem; and that is down to the user/regulator. 'Independence' is a cornerstone of airworthiness. There is none in MoD.

Last edited by tucumseh; 14th Apr 2020 at 08:11.
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