WRT your questions there are no simple answers yet. But the views of QF pilots about their work rules are not as convoluted as some would make them out to be.
There are factors built into the QF LH contract,
agreed between management and pilots over decades, with real and pragmatic aspects derived from the incremental changes to LH flying during the time the airline went from Super-Connies, to 707s, to 747s, to the 747SP, to 767 & 747-400, then finally A330/A380; Qantas is/was somewhat of a subject matter expert (SME) on the development of long-haul flying. Changes like:
- Multi-sector trans-oceanic to single hop trans-Pacific etc.
- Crews with navigators, radio operators & flight engineers eventually became only two-pilots in the seat at any time.
- Crew rests have improved to where agreement was ultimately reached, through operational experience, on what features the two separate rest spaces for ‘inactive’ crew should have.
- ‘night loadings’ for ‘back-of-the-clock’ (BoC) time spent in an aircraft which had the effect, as a fatigue mitigator, of increasing the value of night flying such that pilots so rostered got more time off under the ‘credit hours’ system. and
- ‘overtime’, which was also agreed to by Qantas, surely in part as an acknowledgement that there should be some inducement for crews to do it at all.
Many feel that, in the last few years, the dissembling from QF management has been astounding! Many point out;
- The present contract is more ‘scientific’ (by virtue of practical experience & long-standing agreement about all the factors involved) than a few spin “research (delivery) flights” with compliant passenger loads & crew.
- QF taking 10 years to introduce the 787 only to then blame the pilots for being difficult when the crew rest didn’t comply with the company’s own agreement, was too tricky by half!!
- The much talked-about contract ‘simplification’ seeks to undo, for expediency & with no scientific basis, the very agreement to which the company is a party.
- QF fails to acknowledge that, especially with the Oz-dollar where it is, QF’s pilot costs are substantially below many, if not most, serious competitors.
- HUGE mistrust brough about by constant denials about what seemed obvious plans (eg “there are no plans for an international low-cost carrier” etc) which came true shortly after the denials.
- The ‘virtue-signalling’ about Fatigue Risk Management (FRM) while;
* inferring that CASA is already ‘on-board’ with what QF wants,
* having only assertions to support the direction being taken,
* stifling access to QF’s own previous LH fatigue research undertaken in the late ‘90s & early 2000s,
* having such a ‘threatening’ current process for flagging ‘fatigue’ that most pilots would rather just ‘go sick’ or, if they do start into the fatigue protocol, pilots are deducted days sick leave (personal leave) balances anyway,
* The expediency of circumventing even the sensible aspects (in a FRM sense) of the QF EA which saw JQ’s early 787 pilots doing heavy-crewed BoC flying with no crew rest and often sleeping on the floor of the flight deck rather than try to rest sitting upright in the passenger cabin. (just because other operators do it does NOT make it valid/safe/safer/fair/sound/humane/sensible!)
None of this says change is impossible, or even undesirable. But the
massive mistrust of anything said from above is a problem of their own making. The perception of new, even lower, ambit claims after the supposed win-win of a Joyce-proclaimed 30% productivity improvement for 787 flying is galling to all. The supposed ‘contractual excesses’ of a very-few pilots pale into insignificance when compared to the perceived enormous insincerity of QF’s IR strategies. There is never
any acknowledgement that perhaps the QF contract was on the right track for ULH flying; QF seems to use only cynical direction of attention to other (typically newer) operations with less-restrictive/lower-cost models. There is never any recognition that pilots have a vested interest in a successful & safe airline in all aspects of its operations; naturally that sometimes includes remuneration too.
It's almost as if the IR philosophy is; Start with a ridiculous, even knowingly unattainable, low-ball plan. That way, when any agreement is finally reached, it will look like QF gave more ground toward the solution.
So, that’s how some see Project Sunrise. If it can be made to work sensibly in terms of fatigue, health & longevity, profitability and passengers, then bring it on. But people would also like to see an end to the snake-oil and implied threats.