Perhaps I could offer some thoughts here...
In my professional view, the FAA and Boeing have serious questions to answer. Not only about the 737 MAX episode itself, but the serious shortcomings that have been revealed in the way that the FAA was discharging its responsibilities for safety management and oversight with Boeing. As for Boeing, I'm confident that they will eventually face charges for corporate manslaughter (or similar). PPrune readers might be interested to know that the FBI has already started a criminal investigation of its own into Boeing.
Personally though, I don't think it's especially helpful to frame issues in an 'extreme opposites' way. I don't think that the FAA's system is a 'profit driven shambles'. But I do think that it has some serious issues to address, and needs to address them quickly. Likewise, I don't think that the MoD's air safety management system is 'a model of perfection' - but it, too has some serious issues to look at.
Looking first at the FAA, to my mind the most significant consequence of the 737 MAX episode might be the possible breakdown of the system of 'national lead airworthiness certification' (my phrase, I apologise if its a bit clumsy) that existed before the crashes. Then, the FAA and EASA basically led the world's civil airworthiness management. If the FAA or EASA said an aircraft produced under their jurisdiction was safe, other nations who were buying the aircraft essentially 'signed up' to their safety assessments.
I think this system might be breaking down. The responses to the two MAX crashes were not co-ordinated, with China, the UK and other nations taking a series of independent actions before the FAA eventually acted, apparently under presidential pressure. In recent weeks and months, there have been a number of indications that individual national airworthiness authorities will carry out their own detailed assessments before accepting anything that comes out of the FAA. In some cases, they are talking about imposing different national safety requirements, including additional pilot training. I would not be surprised if China didn't use the issue to apply more pressure on the US to resolve their trade dispute. Any breakdown in the international air safety system could be significant if it happens.
For the MoD, the greatest risk to safe operation of military aircraft is, in my view, the potential for failures at 'working desk' level to actually carry out mandated instructions, coupled with a failure by the MAA to detect such failures in time. The MoD has spent much time and effort in constructing a new and (allegedly) improved air safety management system. Personally, I believe that there is much about the new system that is good, especially its location within the wider MoD Safety Management Organisation. The new regulations are, in my view (and thats all it is) comprehensive and fairly logically laid out. The 'Duty Holder' system makes a pretty good stab at codifying and clarifying sometimes complex issues of responsibility for air safety.
BUT....having a good system is only half the battle. The other half is making sure that everybody within that system is actually doing what the system says they should be doing. Time and again, MAA SIs make a series of recommendations, many of which are repeating what the regulations and instructions already say. To my mind, the MAA should focus on how it assures itself that the people within the system are doing what they are supposed to do. I'm not sure that its current system of reviews and inspections are doing that. They certainly haven't been doing that to date, as the evidence shows. Example - how did the Hawk PT get its MAA certification and authorisations without the MAA noticing that it didn't have a safety case for the ejection seat? How did the MAA allow it to issue an RTI that involved dismantling part of the seat without calling up the required functional checks? Why did the MAA not notice the long series of reissues of that RTI - a sure indication that there were problems with the original one, problems that generated additional air safety risks. In my appointment as the Sea Harrier Engineering Manager, I know that if I had issued an RTI like that, then reissued it four more times, I would immediately have had a very pointed conversation with senior engineers. Actually, I would never have been allowed to issue an RTI like that in the first place.
So, that's my message to everybody out there. Don't expect 'the system' to keep your aircraft safe. Take personal responsibility at every level. If it looks wrong - report it. Question it. Challenge it.
And here's my question for the excellent PPrune community to consider, if they would be so kind. Is it time for the MAA to set up a 'Whistleblower' scheme? Of course, any 'whistleblowers' would have to be able to go to someone outside the MAA for it to work. There's a challenge.
I apologise for the length of this post, but I thought a subject as serious as is deserved a bit of attention.
Best Regards, as ever, to all those good people within the MAA doing their important jobs,
Engines