Originally Posted by
tucumseh
Getting back to Nutloose's original observation, RAF planners and DE&S procurers are in a difficult position.
Many of them will still recall that one of the successful components of the RMPA/Nimrod 2000/Nimrod MRA4 programme (a relative term, given it was a certainty to fail) was the infrastructure at Kinloss, much of which was on schedule when (at various times) the programme was extended, and finally cancelled. (It remains unclear if the huge cost of this was included in the headline ~£4Bn waste).
Given the tendency of the Services to change requirements, sometimes with legitimate reason, such background, but still fundamental, tasks are fraught with the risk that they may be rendered redundant before being put to use. My guess is this was all recognised and a decision made not to commit too early.
I think its even simpler than that. The decision to procure Poseidon OTS, off the back of an existing USN order, essentially meant the lead time between order and delivery was much shorter than would typically be the case, if we'd had a long winded procurement, bespoke purchase, etc.
Then factor in the time to firm up a basing decision, draw up requirements, let the contracts, start building, and you end up where we are today.