Morno, agreed, and there has supposedly been extensive fatigue research carried out on the B787 since it’s arrival by a panel that is supposedly bi-partisan (AIPA and QF).
The trouble is, this research (and prior studies) never seems to lead anywhere sensible, because it usually provides evidence that the Company (and indeed the regulator) don’t want to hear. QF’s current FRMS consists solely of a photocopy of the regs and another photocopy of the EBA with the title FRMS pasted above it!
So given the toothless nature of any studies so far (and the laughable 3 proposed test flights), giving up existing industrial protections in the hope of future scientifically-based FRMS protections would be ill-advised.
One thing they did give up for the B787 was penalty rates for ULR ops. This I actually agree with - fatigue should not be a financial consideration. It should be about health and safety (both short and long term). Financially compensating unhealthy work practices (“danger money”) should have no place in this industry.
However, I believe the current argument about night credits relates to 3-pilot ops (read Asia) for the B787 - presumably because the B787 will be slated to gradually replace outgoing A330s on these flights. The A330 has night credits, and if the Company gets their way, the B787 pilots will be required to fly more hours per roster than the A330 pilots currently do.
The pilots played ball last EBA, and gave the Company an incredibly productive deal for the B787, which Alan himself crowed about to the media. Now it appears the Company wants more, using the old trick that if the pilots don’t agree, they won’t buy the aircraft. Will the pilots call their bluff? I don’t know, but that is what Alan’s current media campaign is all about. It isn’t about scientific fatigue management.