Originally Posted by
StudentInDebt
this amuses me, or saddens me. During a sim involving stall recovery training a few years ago I was asked what signs would indicate approaching the stall by the TC (Checkie). I reeled off the above list of signs and was immediately corrected as the correct answer is apparently - an audible “STALL STALL” warning and then treated to a white board presentation of the speed tape cues to correct my lack of understanding of the question. Finger, pulse etc
Your observations are sadly consistent with observations of multiple training systems and operators. A simple hard fact about the real world vs simulator training is that events in the real world are dynamic and frequently confusing in the development of cues to the crew. The quoted instructor's point on what counts as primary cues belies the fact that in most CVR tapes, there is most often profound confusion and cacophony arising from multiple cues, warnings, alerts and dynamic inputs. The training focusing on exact displayed data is lost in the noise, whereas what does invariably exist is the big picture factors; attitude, air noise, response to controls, vibration etc. Basing the determination of your flight path and energy state to a "STALL, STALL" alert or a flashing red light is akin to planning to avoid obstacles in your car by the cue of the airbag deployment, rather than the cues from looking out the window.
The sad fact is that when a loss of SA occurs, recovery of the split between expectation and reality arises from the outside inwards, from the woods not the trees, from the overview to the detail. Awareness of flight dynamics and the response of the aircraft to flight controls is the absolute first part of flight training for very good reason; detail inputs are beneficial to accuracy but not to global comprehension of flight state.
When we train stalls in the simulator, we train to BS canned, staged conditions, that (and I apologise to all of the TRI/TCE's in advance of the following comment but....) minimises the training value fo the exercise. a stall or loss of control condition in the real world occurs from a loss of SA, and that is necessary to be the case to gain greatest training value. The logical outcome from my heretical position is that recovery training needs to concentrate on big brush items, not detail, "lipstick on the pig" stuff. Every aircraft (other than helicopters) will fly given half a chance. AF447 would have recovered had the pilots taken their hands off the controls, and placed the thrust levers to idle. Same applies to a Pitts, 747, and even most odd ball B/A aircraft like the F4, if the recovery is commenced early enough, at the point where the aircraft stops responding in the expected manner to the pilots control input.
The FAA improved their position on stall recognition and recovery, but the manner in which we do the training today remains less than optimal. Flight crew should not be afraid of stalls, they are embarrassing when inadvertent, but they are just another part of the envelope of the aircraft, and our training acts to increase anxiety in what is just another part of driving the plane. Reliance on warnings and instruments that have shown themselves to be prone to error is a lousy basis to keep the blue side on top reliably.
The French legal system has spoken, and it appears to be a limited scope of causation that has been determined to be causal in 447. The crews competence is in part the consequence of organisational and regulatory training and qualification standards and their efficacy. The decision on the removal and replacement of a known compromised sensor system was also the result of factors beyond the crew who were confronted with the consequence with an adverse outcome.
"Tout commence en mystique et finit en politique." Péguy