Originally Posted by
SASless
Megan is right....another large oil company that on its face maintained high standards but once you got to looking it was another. matter.
The management evolved from a Gulf of Mexico operator and brought over that same old attitude with them.
The FAA sets VFR minimums based upon "Weather" (Ceiling and Visibility)....not what you can see out the windows.
So right next to 412's with Sperry Helipilot systems with Flight Directors....you had 212's with no SAS of any kind flying the same routes at the same time of day as the 412's.
Offshore, particularly on an overcast and hazy night....about the only thing you could see sometimes was two very big white shiny eyes looking back at you from your Windscreen.
But...hey...it was VFR right!
You had a thousand and three, right?
That is where I elected to use the room name of ..... Sasless!
I was not impressed as you might guess.
Originally Posted by
RL77CHC
I think Malabo hit the nail on the head........
This departure is completely routine for the Offshore / EMS / Military guys. The CAT A helipad departure profile that needs to be flown in the AW139 does not change whether it's day or night, engine failure or not. The second that aircraft hits TDP and the pilots starts their rotation it's a pure instrument procedure after that. The flying pilot manually flies the profile and acknowledges the non flying pilots callouts while the non flying pilot make his standard calls and monitors for any deviations. If the deviation callout isn't acknowledged and or corrected by the flying pilot, the non flying pilot immediately takes control of the aircraft. This is standard two crew, multi ifr operations anywhere in the world.
I would guess that the departure SOPS's and callouts would look similar to this from 99% of the AW139 Multi Pilot, IFR operators out there
Flying Pilot "Lifting"
Applies collective to pull into hover
Non Flying Pilot "Two AP's"
Ensures both autopilots are on before the aircraft is pulled into the hover
Fly Pilot "C of G okay Hover Checks"
Calls for hover checks in a stable 5' hover
Non Flying Pilot "Flight Instrument Checked, Temperatures and Pressure in the green, CAS messages checked, you are hovering at XX PI, Target PI XX, Hover Checks Complete"
Flying Pilot "Departing"
Smoothly applies target takeoff power
Non Fly Pilot "Target PI Set"
Monitors PI and ensures the correct takeoff power is set
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "TDP"
Calls takeoff decision point, TDP, at the briefed radalt for the CAT A profile selected
Flying Pilot "Rotating"
Rotates to -10 degrees for one second and then levels the wings with the horizon on instruments
Non Flying Pilot "Two positive Rates of Climb"
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "Airspeed Alive"
Calls airspeed alive when it begins to move
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "VTOSS"
Calls VTOSS at 40 KIAS
Flying Pilot "Check"
Adjusts pitch to +5 degrees nose up
Non Flying Pilot "VY - Select 100NR"
Calls VY at 80 KIAS
Flying Pilot "Check - 100NR Selected Confirm?"
Non Flying Pilot "I confirm 100NR Selected"
Flying Pilot "Setting Climb Power"
Non Flying Pilot "Check Climb Power Is Set"
Etc, Etc, Etc
If a loss of power were to occur nothing changes with the calls or the profile. There might be a bit of NR droop initially but it wouldn't be below the minimum limitation if you did nothing with the collective at max gross weight. You would have to regain the NR to 100% passing VTOSS but this would only take a slight downward correction on the collective. The non flying pilot not only has to make the dozen or standard calls within the first 20-30 seconds of flight but also has to monitor for any deviations and be quick to take control if the calls aren't met with an immediate correction or acknowledgement. The list of standard deviation calls that most two crew, multi-ifr helicopter operators use is way more comprehensive than the standard SOP calls listed above on a CAT A helipad departure. The bottom line is this stuff is not hard at all when you train to proficiency. All of us can have our internal gyros toppled departing into a blackhole but if the monitoring, standard calls, deviation calls and a means to take control are all clearly defined this should be a non event. I'm interested to see how accurately the CAT A profile was flown and what calls were made between the flying pilot and non flying pilot from the hover point through the departure. The CVR and FDM data should sort that out extremely quickly. Does the NTSB issue a preliminary finding to rule out a mechanical issue or pilot error like we do in the UK? I know there are several operators that are crossing their fingers the fleet of AW139's isn't grounded due to a mechanical issue. This is still sounding like a classic CFIT(W) case with a flight crew that wasn't given the opportunity to maintain proficiency.
Whatever the investigation result will be, (system failure or CFIT or loss of control due to disorientation...) I would like to share the following considerations and hear your opinions.
After the G-LBAL accident I red the final report and felt as my duty to send a note to the AAIB web team via email (
[email protected]) in august 2016.
I was furthermore convinced after I found my self during what most of you call a "black-hole departure" as PM and I had to call the PF to correct deviations in pitch and power, excess in nose down and power index attempting to get IAS alive after TDP and loss of visual references.
The posts quoted above are getting some points which are the key to these hybrid departures on AW139s.
Hybrid because "The FAA sets VFR minimums based upon "Weather" (Ceiling and Visibility)....not what you can see out the windows"
About the other post, put it together with the body of the email I pasted below.
After two more years and 500 more hours on type and some more black-hole departures, I would add also in the sim training some details about the collective force trim, the power index spontaneous variation management after TDP/rotation, and enphasys about IAS limits of engaging/disengaging of GA, TU, etc. for the different phases, 5 to 7. Moreover the difference in engaging GA in phase 7 from previous ones. The difference between engaging LNAV and HDG, especially when magnetic field is abnormal. Also the AW169 Wing Level function should be considered by the constructor for AW139 as well.
Forgive my english. Even in my own language I'm not very good in writing.
The body of my email:
I disagree with:
1) “a slight tailwind may have affected the
helicopter during its departure; this would be one cause of a late registering of airspeed
in comparison with other, into-wind, departures”
In my experience, late registering of airspeed happens in all confined/vertical/short-field procedures, with front wind, and with a maximum 10° nose down pitch as indicated by the RFM.
Attitude recovering from -10° to 0° is commanded by time (2 seconds) and not by airspeed, ground speed or outside visual references.
The manual dictates then that the 0° pitch must be maintained till Vtoss is reached.
Several seconds with 0° pitch are necessary before suddenly airspeed gets “alive” and goes, in a very short time and sometimes instantly, from zero to 40/50Kts IAS.
During night VFR departures from coastal helipads, visual references are actually lost at TDP.
Take-off procedure is then performed from TDP with the sole reference to instruments till modes can be engaged (Phase 5 software) only at 60Kts IAS.
Experience in these procedures during day VFR operations integrates the type rating training, giving the pilot the absolute trust in the effectiveness of the sequences, even during the zero kts IAS phase.
Moreover, cues for pitch and power index are available (when set) in the PFD during all the sequence from hover to Vtoss, no matter if day or night operations.
Therefore, Cat A take-off procedures are actually performed with reference to instruments even during day VFR operations.
RFM and TRI should emphasize that
- Category A take-off procedures are actually performed with reference to instruments even during day VFR operations
- Delay in IAS is usual in these procedures and should be ignored till it gets “alive”
In my opinion, to be discussed:
“Safety Recommendation 2015-025
The European Aviation Safety Agency should amend its definition of Vmini, to
provide a clear definition that reflects the legitimacy of flight under instrument
flight rules by reference to external visual cues at speeds below Vmini.”
AW139 RFM can not reflect this recommendation: external cues are not utilized to perform a correct Cat A vertical/confined/short-field take-off