Originally Posted by
yoko1
Let's be fair here. The "evidence" you cite involved upgraded software/firmware that had not yet been certified for flight, much less installed on the accident aircraft, during a test that intentionally created a malfunction that was unrelated to MCAS.
Let us indeed be fair here. The upgraded software/firmware that Boeing delivered to the FAA is by far the most important project that Boeing has undertaken in years, and its success may even be essential for the long-term viability of the company's commercial aircraft division (i.e. to salvage the MAX and the company's reputation). One might assume, therefore, that Boeing has spared absolutely no resources or personnel on developing this software fix (to contemplate otherwise would result in an even more frightening assessment of the competence of Boeing management).
This means, therefore, that
even Boeing's best engineers, when provided with unlimited resources, could not develop a safe fix for the MAX on the first try.