Originally Posted by
wheelsright
Sorry to push you on this, but that is not a clear answer. What precisely is the procedure that the ET302 pilots should have followed? ie What would you have done? That is not in any way suggesting the the ET302 followed the correct procedure.
This has been covered before, but here it is again. This particular malfunction (AOA failure generating an erroneous stall signal) first presents itself as an unreliable airspeed event. The 737 has a procedure called "Airspeed Unreliable" which if properly followed, would have put the aircraft in a stabilized configuration at a safe altitude. An important point is that the flap configuration should not have been changed (i.e. flaps left extended) until the "Airspeed Unreliable" checklist had at least proceeded far enough to identify if either pilot actually had a reliable airspeed. In theory, the ET302 crew should have also been in possession of the information on MCAS that came out after the Lion Air 610 accident, and given this information they should have left the flaps extended and returned to the departure airport for landing. In this case, MCAS would never had activated.
There is some suggestion that the information on MCAS was not properly distributed to the crews. However, in this case I still question whether the flaps should have been retracted given the nature of the malfunction. Even so, if the crew had first completed the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, they would have been in a stabilized aircraft at a higher altitude. Once the flaps were retracted, the erroneous MCAS activation would have presented itself as runaway stab trim. Those procedures have already been discussed, but they were not followed either. So in short, there were two well-established procedures that were not used, and if used would have had a decidedly different outcome.