Originally Posted by
737 Driver
I do not disagree in theory, but IMHO, the reality is that the training standards dictated by Boeing have been catering to the lowest common denominator for years. They have a strong incentive to sell aircraft across the entire spectrum of airlines and countries regardless of the depth and quality of their aviation heritage. Requiring a higher level of demonstrated skills for the operator potentially translates into higher costs and lost sales.
Sadly, this thought process does not stop at Boeing. I recently had an opportunity to fly with FO who was relatively new to the 737. During our trip, we discussed a number of issues that had come out of the recent MAX crashes. During this conversation, he confessed that before these accidents, he did not even know the stab trim wheel had a stowable handle and had never been trained in its use. Think about that for a moment. Also consider that a freshly-minted 737 Captain would have received the exact same training.
After I picked my jaw up off the floor, I proceeded to personally give the FO the training he had missed. Afterwords, I shared my concerns with my Fleet Manager and told him in no uncertain terms that our training programs needed a thorough review. The Fleet Manager replied that this was already in progress, and stated that our training programs were constantly being reviewed for improvement. He added a telling remark, however, that stab trim malfunctions had never been a statistically significant problem at our airline, implying of course that the training events our pilots are exposed to constantly needed to be justified by historical data. I told him that if the MAX accident had occurred at our airline, the family of those who perished would have been rightfully angered if it had come to be known that the crew had not been properly trained in a runaway stab procedure because the airline considered it to be a statistically insignificant event.
The degradation of pilot training and standards is a worldwide problem. It is being driven in large part by the beancounter mentality that attempts to justify every cost. Unfortunately this approach forgets that there are some costs that cannot be easily quantified, and eventually a price will be paid in bent metal and broken bodies. Sadly, even if the industry will not openly admit it, there seems to be an underlying assumption that there is an acceptable hull loss rate and that little will change until the body count goes up.
Could not agree more.
A few companies and almost two decades ago I upgraded in a small company flying 50-seaters. Before they let you on the line there was extensive checking before upgrade started, and OE/line-training till every deficiency was corrected or you were send back to the right seat, SIM training was something different every half year, with a specific training syllabus send out a few weeks prior to prepare. I upgraded a few years ago on the A320, got 7(!) sectors of OE and was send on my way. In my first few months, and flying with new FOs (company growing fast) I had quite a few things I had never seen before: no FD take-off due to dispatched with the engines in N1 rated mode, FD deferred and several others I had never seen online or in the SIM. Most of the training now is checking the required boxes, same scenario every time, and there are so many items you are doing "250 to the marker" CATIII and OEI/SE because of time constraints.....
I am lucky my company lets me fly raw data/AP/AT off except when required by regulations (RNAV SID/LO-VIS/AUTO landing) so I have been able to stay current, and show a lot of "inexperienced" FOs all these things, but it really should be trained to proficiency before getting to the line.
Also, I really agree with your take on the automation dependency issue.
Boeing needs a company wide overhaul of their certification department, with much more regulatory oversight to rebuilt confidence. The massive mistakes made in certifying MCAS, (and all the other surrounding issues like AOA discrepancy warnings left inactive due to third party software (no excuse IMHO)) makes me believe heads should roll at every level.
Having said that, just because Boeing messed up. doesn't mean the pilots didn't. There have been more instances of LOC in-flight were the only crew action was a frantic attempt to re-engage the AP. If that is the best you can do, you are not trained/capable to be in the cockpit. Most of what the pilots did in the 3 flights we are talking about speaks to severe training/handling issues.
Continuing a flight with the stick shaker, and then only writing up reverse STS trim is IMO on of the primary causes for the first crash.
Using trim two dozen times to correct MCAS, but never interrupting the MCAS while it was trimming (so only re-active, never pro-active), and still not switching the trim off, or reducing power?
Switching the trim off while out of trim, but not reducing power, and no hand trimming till it was too late?
None of theses events had a single easy checklist that would have resolved everything, but it does still say in the manual, that there is no checklist for every conceivable problem, and pilots are expected to be able use their skills to control the aircraft, while handling unexpected situations.