@
Mach2point7
Lets not be distracted by that argument. The real issue is that if the AoA disagree signal system was available " in keeping with Boeing’s fundamental design philosophy of retaining commonality with the 737NG" why on earth was it not used as a critical input to the MCAS activation logic ??
Valid point! This will be critical in lawsuits.
The "excuse" is a technical one IMO (not that Boeing has admitted anything). It is complicated to design a system such as MCAS that is both reliable and safe. The more inputs there are into a system, the more chance there is it will fail to carry out its intended purpose. In the case of MCAS, this would have severely delayed certification. Somewhere along the process, the urgency of reliable activation of MCAS became more important than the safety aspects, which were pushed onto the pilots, in the "unlikely" event of AOA failure.