Originally Posted by
GordonR_Cape
In a recent post I pointed out that the training on the B737 NG simulator that all pilots get, plus the brief computer knowledge about the MAX differences, produce different kinds of memory. Adding the somewhat ambiguous emergency AD, means it is not immediately obvious what the correct procedures are to fly the aircraft, and recall during stressful situations is diminished.
The cascading series of failures triggered by faulty AOA, is particularly insidious. Once past the initial startle factor, and when MCAS activates, controlling pitch is no longer just flying the aircraft as previously trained. When the computer starts fighting the pilot, the crew have to switch back to diagnostic mode, and this is when sensory overload really sets in.
I appreciate some of the comments made by
737 Driver , but IMO repeating the "mantra" does no justice to a complex and rapidly evolving flight emergency. I am not a pilot, and have little to teach
737 Driver , but must point out that this discussion has been going on for many months, long before (he) became a forum member.
Yes much credit needs to be given to the 737 pilots posting on this thread, possibly mostly 737 Driver.
But now this thread seems over till the final report/s are given - we have waffled on for too long now the power beyond control decides time is up. Who reset the cut out switches that let the machine takeover?
Some very knowledgeable folk posted here, keep up your great work.