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Old 4th May 2019, 22:09
  #4893 (permalink)  
L39 Guy
 
Join Date: Jul 2011
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Originally Posted by HundredPercentPlease
Your ferocious ego is diminishing any points you may have. Even though it's unlikely (even given your join date), you are sounding like a Boeing shill.

Clearly they didn't meet your expectations. As you know, you can overload anyone in the sim - to the point of failure. Others here, myself included, believe that this crew were overloaded and suffered cognitive difficulties as a result. If they had been trained, or at least made properly aware of what would happen with a single AoA failure on takeoff, then their cognitive position may have been different. But stall, UAS and then MCAS is a triple-nasty that appears to have beaten every crew faced with it.

You also seem to believe that the ET crew didn't know that if all else fails, fly the aircraft. What you will not accept is that they knew that that was what they had to do, but couldn't - due to overload.

Finally - the answer to the problem is either to remind everyone to prioritise the flying of the aircraft (because they didn't know that), or fix the aircraft so it's no killer. Which may prove tricky, now the limitations of the manual (hand crank) trim system are being revealed.
Please, let's not personalize this and attack individuals. 737 Driver has invested a lot of time and effort in addressing a lot of issues raised on this thread and for that he deserves everyone's respect whether you agree or disagree with him.

The crews of the accident aircraft did not meet the expectations of 737 Driver, myself and, most importantly, the passengers that bought tickets on those flights. While there are multiple events involved in these accidents, let's break this down to the first event which lasted up to 2 minutes before the flaps were selected up:
  1. Explain to me how and why, long before MCAS reared its ugly head, that these crews could not recognize an UAS (stick shaker, IAS DISAGREE, etc) and not set an attitude and power setting per the NNC?
  2. Explain to me how and why a professional flight crew would let the speed of the aircraft hit Vne (340 kts plus) while supposedly hand flying an aircraft?
  3. Explain to me why one would engage the autopilot at 400 ft while in stick shaker (stall) or UAS?
This is a UAS event, pure and simple at this stage of the game. And they couldn't even do that! If they had an engine failure at V1 there is not a hope in hell that they could fly the aircraft if they couldn't even manage a UAS event. And, by the way, an engine failure before, during or after V1 has a startle factor too.
  1. Explain to me how and why the crew of the Lion Air incident flight was able to do the UAS drill and also control the speed of the aircraft such that manually trimming the aircraft was possible and, indeed, were able to fly to destination with UAS, stick shaker and manual stab trim?
With respect to limitations of the manual trim of the B737, I know of no aircraft that can be flown at Vne with full nose down trim. No aircraft, flown by a professional, should be allowed to get into that corner. How about pulling those two levers between the pilots back to idle rather than leaving it at take-off power? That will quickly bring the speed of the aircraft into a regime where one can manually trim the aircraft. But that involves flying the damn airplane, a basic skill that the industry seems to have lost in this and other accidents/incidents recently.

Last edited by L39 Guy; 4th May 2019 at 22:25.
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