Originally Posted by
L39 Guy
Yet the accident crews had the same startle factor and couldn't even get to first base, i.e. UAS drill. And they had almost two minutes to execute that simple, memory checklist. And had they done just that, they would not have been racing around at 340 kts, making manual trim and hand flying with nose down trim impossible due to control forces. Instead, they could have manhandled that aircraft while they sorted out the trim including using the manual trim wheel and could have flown all day long in that condition, just like the Lion Air incident flight.
Can you comment on the possibility that the ET crew diagnosed the UAS as a a false warning per the Boeing flow chart that was posted a while ago. My bolding'
If AoA sensor is failed high,stick shaker on failed side will activate on rotation accompanied by IAS/ALT disagree warning flags
Ifthe pitch power and config are consistent with takeoff and the good side ASI agrees with the Standby ASI,then it is a false warning
------------ If in any doubt execute the UAS NNC
The pilot with good side data becomes PF
Land immediately
Even if they did diagnose it as false warning it does appear they were continuing on rather than "land immediately"
It is possible that the real "startle factor" moment was the combination of autopilot disconnect followed by first MCAS trim, up till then it might have been in the 'understood and handled' category. The speed was about 250 knots at time of first MCAS input.
Another way of framing this is what if the bird strike (or whatever the cause) had happened at 05:39:55 after the flaps had been retracted following an uneventful takeoff, this would have left them in same state: Autopilot disconnect immediately followed by MCAS ND trim.
Note: I agree with much of what has been said on condition of pilot training/competency, seems to have devolved into a 'tick the checkbox' multiple choice exercise.