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Old 4th May 2019, 11:34
  #4843 (permalink)  
PaxBritannica
 
Join Date: Apr 2017
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I accept that pilots are trained to react to certain situations in a manner that does not require them to make nuanced decisions. This seems eminently sensible. However, it seems to me that this requires pilots to be sure that they're reacting to the right problem. If you get UAS, along with a bunch of other anomalies you wouldn't normally expect, I think the human brain might hesitate to diagnose. The fact that performing the UAS memory items may have saved the day does not mean that this was clear to the ET crew in the moment.

In the Lion Air cases, crews had no idea MCAS existed, and struggled to make a diagnosis. The first crew 'happened' on a solution. The second crew had to factor in the plane's behaviour AS WELL AS the underlying knowledge that the a/c had misbehaved in a mysterious way the flight before.

The Ethopian crew were in a position to know that MCAS existed, although it seems their company had not provided them with much information. Like most MAX pilots, they would have had to think through for themselves - on their own time - how an MCAS anomaly might present. In the moment, with the cockpit screaming at them, they were - in real time - having to work out if this was an MCAS problem and whether this affected what they should do. Runaway MCAS is not quite the same as runaway stabiliser. Remember: at that time, MCAS had caused problems only once; Boeing had downplayed the seriousness of the issue and subtly blamed the third-world airline; despite the hull loss Boeing had not rushed to put a correction in place. The situation was foggy and confusing.

The crew was highly motivated to keep this plane safe. I'm sure we all agree on that? But Boeing's poor handling of the MCAS bad news may itself have contributed to the ET crash. The fact that, with their own lives on the line, these pilots were not able to work out what to do, suggests that crews needed proper training in how to incorporate MCAS issues into their diagnostic triggers. Pilots depend on training that reduces their startle response and allows them to diagnose quickly. Some pilots will need that more than others.
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