Yo gums,
‘We need some test community inputs to this discussion.’
Not sure how any further input from the test community or any other could contribute.
A distant, philosophical view is that with hindsight people view situations as they wish, based on knowledge (often inaccurate) and (irrelevant) past experiences, then fit these to interpretations of incomplete information - a narrow window from FDR and CVR, together with the hazard of ‘internet’ belief (social media).
We rarely question our own thoughts.
This might be the greater threat to the industry than any technical malfunction if these aspects relate to all flight crews (no reason why not - just being human).
Whilst it is unreasonable to expect everyone to have deep knowledge of CS/FAR 25 etc, there should be general confidence that most, if not all aspects of design, certification, and testing have been considered. Rarely and unfortunately in this instance, these processes are not without mistake; similar to the ‘mistakes’ observed in operation. These do not warrant blame, and rarely can ‘cause’ be identified, which would be meaningless anyway - a social construct.
Experiences from investigation of serious incidents (non fatal), with the benefit of pilot interview, conclude that humans behave rationally according to how they saw the situation at that time (irrational with hindsight to an external observer).
Subsequent review of the FDR enable crews to re-evaluate their understanding, not changing what they did, nor providing understanding of why they acted as they did (they don’t know - don’t recall why), but significantly they are able to realign time frames (wildly misjudged), and the event order according to individual viewpoint (no such thing as a shared mental model).
Thus after the event, there is no way of being sure that any discussion represents anything relevant to crew thought, analysis, belief, and action; even accident reports.
A way forward is to consider what can be learnt from these accidents; of course including the comments above, but where speculation - what if - is a basis for safety improvement. Irrespective of any relevance to these accidents, because they will not occur in exactly the same way again.
Test community input; might readjust the views on the crew’s contribution in minimising the effects of malfunction, particularly with ‘grandfather rights’ aircraft. We are not as good as we think we are.
For the future, be very concerned about the balance between new design (or modification) and pilot ability; technology advances faster than crew training / adaptation.
Human performance will limit the advance of technology; but technology will further erode the human role because of lower cost.