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Old 1st May 2019, 16:34
  #4693 (permalink)  
slacktide
 
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
What does that have to do with this thread? This was not a case of the automatics failing and the pilots not knowing how to fly,
Yes, it was. The "automatics" failed by providing undesired and uncommanded control inputs, but this was not the initiating failure that the pilots failed to react to. MCAS did not become a factor until a full minute and fifteen seconds into the flight. The inital failure that was presented to the pilots was stickshaker on takeoff with UAS. Rather than manually flying the aircraft using pitch and power as required by the memory items on the UAS NNC checklist, the accident pilots tried to re-engage the autopilot multiple times, and relied on the autothrottle to manage power, which put them above VMo. This directly contradicts the UAS NNC checklist which has the pilots disengage the autopilot, autothrottle, and flight director as memory items for the first three steps, and further goes on to state "Do not use the the autopilot, autothrottle, or flight directors." Look at the timeline:

5:37:34 ATC clears flight for takeoff
5:38:44 (just after liftoff) AOA disagree, airspeed disagree, altitude disagree, and stickshaker are indicated in FDR
5:38:46 Master Caution light illuminates.
5:38:58 Pilots attempt to engage autopilot
5:39:00 Pilots attempt to engage autopilot
5:39:22 Pilots successfully engage autopilot
5:39:45 Flap retraction begins
5:39:55 Autopilot disengages
5:40:00 MCAS begins MCAS-ing

So, it was a minute and fifteen seconds between the initial indication of a failure, and the undesired, uncommanded trim input. During that time, the pilots did not execute a single step of the UAS NNC checklist that they should have been following from memory. But they sure spent a lot of time heads-down button-pushing that autopilot. It's clear that they were not comfortable manually flying the aircraft as the checklist requires. To be noted, until 5:40:00, the airplane would have been behaving exactly as an NG would during the same type of AOA vane failure, and the procedure to follow during UAS is identical.
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