Posted in error on the parallel thread.
737Driver post number #4304
Quote:
First of all, some of you might be surprised to learn that in a stall condition, the STS will trim the stab nose down at the exact same speed as MCAS and can do so continuously until it hits the stop. This is far more authority than MCAS ever had. Why is not a problem? Because the STS will respect the control column trim cutout switches. These are not the pedestal switches that are activated by the pilot. These limit switches are located at the base of the control column and prevent trimming opposite the direction of column displacement. That is, if a pilot is pulling back on the yoke, then nose down trim is inhibited. If someone is pushing forward on the yoke, nose up trim is inhibited. Thus the authority of STS is limited by the control inputs of the pilot.
One of the bees in my bonnet has been the
removal of that column switch on the MAX. Not just the bypassing of its logic under certain conditions - but the total physical removal.
Despite being in my 80th year, (and posting on the wrong thread) statements like that still stick firm, like the unwinding of MCAS. The switch removal (from under the floor at base of column) never really got a clear answer. Well it did: a dedicated post saying 'I don't know'.
I try to filter my information input, and of course a lot is from the Times publication and our engineering friend in Seattle. The switch is either there, or not there, but it seems if it is, its functionality can be obviated as per 737 Driver's earlier post.
Back to his assertion that it was flyable. I get a sickening feeling that something else apart from psychological overload might be wrong. There are so many able minds chasing the suspected faulty input to that 47' of flying surface, along with the associated loading difficulties, that you'd think remedial action was just a matter of time. But the thing I fear most is months of rewriting of code, some agreement on what is now certification and the craft back in the sky carrying a ghost in the machine.
There is too much pressure to get airborne.
'We' seem to have everything we need to throw light on those terrible moments, but the very fact that so many skilled people, not least of all on this forum, can disagree on the extent of the pilot culpability worries me deeply. There is a huge dichotomy in the judgement of these flying professionals.