Originally Posted by
737 Driver
Yes, it really was that easy.
Do you know what their long term shift pattern was? Have you read the FlyDubai Rostov crash thread? Do you know why they didn't quite get it back in trim? Why they just blipped the switches during the second MCAS activation? They did pretty much everything you ask for, just not quite enough of it. Why? They even identified the issue and operated the cutouts.
Perhaps misleading alarms, violence of stick shaker masking clack of trim, possibility of a number of causes to go through, speed of MCAS operation, repetition of MCAS, startle factor, no sim training for specific event? Fatigue? Heck even Sully said he had a lot of luck, and it took him quite a few seconds for real cognition to come in. And he had none of the above to contend with, just a nice quiet cockpit.
They were acting as test pilots for a failure mode that was easily predictable, that never should have been allowed to pass design stage never mind FMEA and testing. Boeing's responsibility.
You've made up your mind but I'd prefer to give a little slack to two dead guys who had to add "systems faulting engineer" to their CV at the drop of a hat.