Originally Posted by
George Glass
Lots of people getting upset at experienced B737 drivers being “ judgmental” and assuming they would have done better.
Well, back to basics.
- Stick shaker on rotation. Do NOT engage the autopilot.
- Commence Airspeed Unreliable Checklist.
Yes you DO reduce thrust to 80% and maintain 10 degrees nose up.
The procedure is specifically designed to keep you flying at a safe speed and rate of climb. Just do it.
Disconnect the auto throttle as per the checklist.
-Fly the aircraft
-DO NOT maintain straight and level with autopilot and autothrottle engaged and allow aircraft to continue to accelerate to VNE while failing to ensure terrain clearance.
-Uncommanded Trim? Complete Runaway Stabilizer checklist as per training and specific Boeing recommendation in AD briefing we have all read ,and presumably understood ,as a result of previous accident.
-DO NOT allow airspeed and trim status to runaway to the extent that recovery becomes difficult or impossible.
Anything so far beyond the wit of a well trained Pilot?
Am I a Boeing troll? No, just an experienced B737 Pilot who still cant understand how you can get an aircraft so out of shape.
What do you think we get paid for?
Give that the pilots recently have read the new AD in relation to MCAS.
The stick shaker was an item of possible occurrences of MCAS but not limited to.
The pilot reported having control issues to the tower, not an unreliable airspeed. So they may not be interested in the Unreliable Airspeed Checklist and more trying to recall the AD.
MCAS apparently does not work with AP engaged - and in the obvious confusion with clearly not enough training on the difference on type to the MAX, the attempt to get control was to put on the AP.
I do not think that there is any possible reason that can claim that this MAX, does not require far more and far better training than what was/has been given.
After the first MAX crash I expect there was a large amount of "the pilots stuffed up" and this AD is just a band aid to keep
PR looking good. After the second crash, I will bet that a very large number of MAX pilots had a second and very detailed look at both the AD and MCAS - and many were concerned.
The reason that both these aircraft crashed is because MCAS moved the stabiliser (had it not - no crashes) - there was no training given about MCAS and MCAS was not even mentioned when these aircraft were delivered. That is the basic error, anything after that is a domino.