Originally Posted by
HundredPercentPlease
It was
three memory checklists:
- Stall recovery.
- UAS recovery.
- Runaway stab (during the UAS recovery and aurally masked by the stick shaker).
The evidence is that 3 is too many - unless possibly you have a third pilot to monitor and assist.
I have a feeling that the Ethiopian captain may have engaged the autopilot as a pre-considered homebrew anti-MCAS strategy. Autopilot in = no MCAS risk.
Interesting idea, but I wonder why he would have decided that his strategy was to engage the autopilot rather than simply leave flaps extended. If he knew enough about MCAS to know that it doesn't operate when autopilot is on, he would presumably also know it doesn't operate with flaps extended. Also if that it what he was thinking, then that implies he knew that the stall warning was false?