Originally Posted by
L39 Guy
In all three MCAS incidents, immediately upon lift-off the aircraft was into an Unreliable Airspeed situation
I disagree. Immediately (at the end of the rotation) the aircraft was indicating a stall, and so the crew performed a stall recovery (lowered AoA by reducing pitch and increasing speed).
Originally Posted by
L39 Guy
why did these pilots, all MAX endorsed, not do two simple, memory checklists particularly the Ethiopian crew that should have been acutely aware of this issue following the Lion Air accident.
It was
three memory checklists:
- Stall recovery.
- UAS recovery.
- Runaway stab (during the UAS recovery and aurally masked by the stick shaker).
The evidence is that 3 is too many - unless possibly you have a third pilot to monitor and assist.
I have a feeling that the Ethiopian captain may have engaged the autopilot as a pre-considered homebrew anti-MCAS strategy. Autopilot in = no MCAS risk.