Because I now have an understanding of MCAS from this thread. It is conceivable, for whatever reason ( demonstration) that MCAS could be handled like a snake charmer that pats a cobra repeatedly on its head. Dangerous yes, but if every time MCAS “attacks”, the pilot immediately uses a blip of manual electric trim to shut it down for 5 seconds , he could fly a tedious ILS in such a condition. The knowledge which I have now, but isn’t in the FCOM, takes the mystery out of the MCAS monster, which can be easily tamed in so many ways: Flaps, autopilot, cutout switches, trim switches
1. I am convinced that the captain incorrectly kept control instinctively because of how extremely green the FO was and the very low altitude. 100 feet.
2. With that thought implanted in his mind he focused only on AP A. instead of B
3. Nevertheless I don’t buy the explanations in this thread thus far, that the captain used manually electric trim on three seperate occasions but stopped at 2.4, 2.3, and 2.3 units exactly, while still leaving him holding back pressure, instead of prolonged trimming until the column was neutral. I consider this a vital clue and one still to be explained.
4. How unfortunate manual electric trim was never used during the 9 seconds of MCAS activation to expose the control of manual electric trim over MCAS.
5. As for 3 out of 3 crews retracting the flaps. It was always expressed, if possible, clean up the aircraft and speed is your friend. Get clean and fast quickly. The flap connection with MCAS was not clear in their minds.
6. The crew had to think through warnings and confusion immediately as the aircraft got airborne : stick shaker from start to finish, master caution, anti ice, left alpha vane, autopilot wailers, GPWS DONT SINK, over speed clacker, while having to hold increasing back pressure on a vibrating column.