FullWings Thanks for your insightful comments.
In the case we are discussing, an AoA probe failure (which is singular, predictable and measurable) has caused a cascade of issues and warnings that are difficult to assimilate and don’t immediately point to any particular checklist
Your statement reinforces a point I made earlier. We have vividly seen how faulty AOA data on the B737 affects so many systems simultaneously, that it creates a hazard in itself.
IMO AOA disagree should never have been an optional display extra, but instead trigger a high priority checklist on its own. BTW, a false low AOA value would not trigger a stick shaker, but does comprise a degraded flight condition.
The proposed software fix will remove the possibility of catastrophic MCAS activation. However the potential for a cascade of AOA derived warnings remains on the B737, including the wider NG series, and should be a concern.
Prompt identification of the underlying AOA trigger would avoid going down multiple redundant fault trees. I understand that changing existing checklists should not be treated lightly, but IMO the current review should be an opportunity to enhance this process.
Edit:
Derfred Thanks for the note about discretion to bypass checklist rules.