Originally Posted by
yanrair
The isolation for MCAS is the STAB OFF switches beside pilots knee. Anything that moves the stab goes through these switches. But, you would have to recognize the problem. Clearly the pilots knew nothing about MCAS like the rest of us. All they may have seen is the STAB running AND - nose down.
The isolation for MCAS is reverse what it did then operate the switch before it does it again. Do that at high speed and low level while you're dealing with multiple critical warnings including IAS disagree, ALT disagree and stick shaker.
This is video game territory and I'm lost why we're still debating it.
Boeing are revising activation thresholds, adding signal redundancy, reducing maximum authority, updating the manual (FCOM, QRH and AMM) and adding training.
Why is anyone left debating whether the implementation of the automation is at fault?