Originally Posted by
TTail
Now that it seems very likely that MCAS was involved in both the Lionair and the Ethiopean accidents, a sad irony emerges namely that the pilots (of the non-accident Lionair flight) who had the least knowledge of both the general MCAS issues and also of their own specific a/c issues, were the only ones who were able to handle the problem. Assuming warnings, cautions and lights were somewhat identical on all three flights - what was different? And what were the significant differences?
One significant difference was the 3rd pilot in the cockpit. It's reported that he was the one proposing to disable the electric trim.
And after reading the WSJ article, suggesting the pilots had difficulty trimming manually with the trim wheels, I wonder if having a 3rd pilot wouldn't have helped with that too.
If that's the case, then clearly the procedure for dealing with runway trim is inadequate, especially in the scenario where MCAS activates. Especially since on the MAX you can no longer disable manual electric trim and automatic electric trim independently, both cutout switches now disable both functions. In older 737s you could re-enable just manual electric trim if needed, you can no longer do that in the MAX.
And I'm annoyed by Boeing's claims that disabling electric trim, after following the runway trim procedure, is all you need to do to deal with this emergency.
And the claim of "making a safe aircraft safer" with the MCAS software update rubbed me the wrong after the Lion Air accident. But when they still kept saying that after the Ethiopian crash, it reeked of refusing to publicly accept responsibility for their contribution to the accidents.
It's like Porsche launching a new 911 model, that automatically opens the throttle when you are climbing a steep hill, and the engine is close to stalling, controlled partly by the RPM sensor. And if the RPM sensor fails, the car will suddenly accelerate for no reason, with no way of turning that off, except by turning off the ignition. Except you now have to brake and get the car under control, and that may be difficult because the power steering and power brakes stop working when the engine is turned off. And imagine having to do that on a winding downhill road.
I think that's a close enough analogy to the 737 MAX problems. What would people then think of Porsche if they would come with a press release saying: "our car is perfectly fine, any driver should know to turn off the engine in that situation"?