Originally Posted by
patplan
Actually, the most intriguing question is: Why the data from the two different vanes of two separate airlines in two separate continents made the MAX-8's, more or less, went berserk the same way...??
There are about 380 B38M's in operation, and about 100 of them - roughly 26% of it- are operated in the US/Canada.
While I agree that the most
important answer to find right now is how a single input error could cause such a catastrophic event, I don't necessarily agree that your question is the most intriguing one. That would depend on whether your interest is centered around hardware, software or humanware. As a pilot of "less than exceptional" skill, I would like to get a handle on whether I was supposed to be able to resolve an MCAS event like these or whether the crew of the non-accident flight indeed were of "exceptional skill" - either in their own right or as a consequence of the third crew member. I'm sure that the vane, wiring, converters, computers and everything else that has anything to do with MCAS are all being scrutinized by the investigative agencies and no MAX will fly again without that issue being resolved.
@Gordon: I have no experience at interpreting those readouts but it seems to me that until the very last part of the accident flight, the speed is fairly constant and multiple trim inputs are being made not only by MCAS but also through manual electric trim. Almost up until the point of the final dive. Where is it indicated that the trim switches were cut?
Edit: With your most recent post I now understand that you talk about the switch cut out happening on the non-accident Lionair flight and the Ethiopean whereas they didn't attempt this action at all on the Lionair accident flight.