Originally Posted by
GordonR_Cape
Trying to fix a faulty MCAS system by adding a third AOA sensor would not be a simple exercise. The necessary design, testing, certification, maintenance and type training changes could take years.
MCAS is not so vital that it justifies rewiring large parts of the aircraft. It only adresses a regulatory issue of pilot yoke elevator feedback in the high AOA part of the manual flight regime.
It is deeply ironic that the issue MCAS was designed to cater for was never flight critical, and might never have occurred during the lifetime of the aircraft. Instead the fix ended up killing hundreds of people.
Are you serious? We have the year 2019 and not 1950. Customers expect a thorough analysis and solution to regain confidence and not an additional kludge.
Thats what the 737 MAX looks on statistics:
https://qz.com/1571820/deaths-on-the...cial-aircraft/
It is a great case for the industry to learn. And it is more about the decision making processes on all levels, than on a technical only analysis of this latent fault condition of the MCAS system. There is a reason that the FAA AIM has about 800 pages written mostly with blood.
Currently Boeing could have made the complete skin of the B737 MAX only from AoA vanes and would still be better off.