That no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 MAX seems to have even raised the issue of using multiple inputs, including
the opposite angle of attack sensor, in the computer’s determination of an impending stall is mind-blowing. As a lifetime member
of the software development fraternity, I don’t know what toxic combination of inexperience, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding led to this.
But I do know that it’s indicative of a much deeper and much more troubling problem. The people who wrote the code for the
original MCAS system were obviously terribly far out of their league and did not know it. How can we possibly think they can
implement a software fix, much less give us any comfort whatsoever that the rest of the flight management software, which is
ultimately in ultimate control of the aircraft, has any fidelity at all?
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249...-PSC6nFA5/view
Travis is unequivocal in his assessment of the Boeing 737 MAX. “It’s a faulty airframe. You’ve got to fix the airframe [and] you can’t fix the airframe without moving the engines” back and away from their current position.The root problem with the engine-forward design is “once this thing pitches up, it wants to keep pitching up,” said Travis. “That’s a big no-no,” he continued, because pitch-up on an aircraft increases angle of attack.
....Travis insists that the pilots of the two fatal 737 MAX flights could not have overridden the system no matter how hard they pulled on the yoke. The only way the system could be overridden was by hitting a circuit breaker that should have been prominently displayed among the 737 MAX controls.
https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1334482#