Originally Posted by
yanrair
Thanks a lot for that feedback on this conference. This refers to a senator saying that AoA indicators should fitted as standard. Fitting AoA indicators is certainly not something that most airlines want even if money were no object. That is why wealthy airlines apart from one perhaps, don't fit them. They can be very confusing, require a lot of training and understanding - far more than the data we already have at our disposal - which many on this forum have said is confusing enough already. An AOA disagree warning would be a good idea and would result in pilots knowing not to trust AoA any more and probably get on the ground asap. and avoid any flight situation that might require their use.
Anyway my concern here is we have people from Donald Trump and now a senator who flies a light aircraft telling the industry how it should be done. An industry that has driven airline deaths to almost zero over the last forty years. Not every year, and 2017 did see one death world wide but to no other industry gets close to those sort of safety improvement statistics.
And of course if the AoA indicators are being fed erroneous information by the AoA sensors then ..................
Y
An AoA disagree was already known to the aircraft systems that is why there was the cascade of other warnings on UAS etc. As was stated upthread slightly more sophisticated software would identify the AoA vane reports that were not behaving within normal parameters. Then the one assumed good AoA could be used with just an alert for the crew that they were now on one AoA. While the new Boeing fix will stop the MCAS issue surfacing, there could be a slightly more sophisticated approach to reduce the instant jump in workload in the cockpit and just provide caution the systems are now using only one AoA ensure pitch and power are correct for each phase of flight (or some such), As was said earlier the 'automation surprise' and cacophony of warnings and systems dropping out only obfuscates what is happening. It is definitely not useful and is likely to create cognitive overload leading to attentional tunneling (tunnel vision) concentrating on something that is actually less important (you have 20 seconds left to hit those switches!!!!). HF people should sit in a cockpit for each type of alert and see how many PANIC PANIC!! warnings are issued that may not actually be totally necessary. All that happens is the majority of these alarms and alerts are not even noticed. So with each failure in a particular flight phase what is the most important alert? Get the pilots' attention on that and do cognitive walkthroughs to find out how the system can
assist the pilots. In some flight phases a minor fault could become major and vice versa. Yes they do this with EICAS/ECAM messages etc., but even they scroll off. It just seems a little more thought could be given to prioritization and alerting types you want the right reaction not panic or tunneling.