Originally Posted by
FCeng84
....................I think this all comes down to assumptions regarding pilot actions given this failure and the sum total of its effects. I am not singling out the crew as solely responsible for the Lion Air accident. We need to focus on the assumptions. As for the Ethiopian accident that is the intended focus of this thread, we simply do not yet have the data necessary to determine if any of this MCAS and errant AOA signal discussion actually applies.
I also don’t blame either crew - not having witnessed the exact situations, it is difficult to say they should have done x or y.
Having said that, I think that SIM training needs to adapt. For 18 years of commercial airline SIM details, I have been given engine failures on take-off. Then a single engine approach to a go around and then a landing. Once airborne again, we are given a systems failure such as hydraulic or electrical failure, or maybe fire or depressurisation and emergency descent. None of this is particularly difficult: a few memory actions, some memory drills, then work through the ECAM, EICAS or QRH
I can only recall having seen unreliable speed or disagreeing sensors or ADI disagrees on a handful of occasions, but they can be very insidious and dangerous. I think that much more emphasis now needs to be applied to computer faults and sensor failures in today’s electronically enhanced aircraft* . More scenarios should include information conflicts which lead to the requirement to revert to Pitch + Power = Performance to recover the aircraft.
Arguably, if a lot more emphasis had been placed on experiencing and practising cockpit information conflicts, and getting used to constantly checking and confirming that pitch, power and control inputs were appropriate; a great many accidents, such as AF447, the SFO 777, and the Swedish CRJ, several poorly flown or crashed go-arounds etc, in recent years could have been rescued by the crews.
* e.g. FBW, Boeing MCAS.