Originally Posted by
Ian W
There needs to be something like an Failure Modes Effects Analysis that flags up that at this point there are multiple separate warnings being displayed in various ways that will consume the entire cognitive resource of the pilot and not allow his primary AVIATE task any resource.
There needs to be an FMEA which understands the Pilot as being part of the system !
There is extensive FMEA/SSA work done for development and certification of aircraft, but it focusses on the physical systems and makes some simplistic/philosophical assumptions for the pilots. We need to better understand the Pilot as one System out of many which need to work together in an aircraft, which can fail in various ways, can recieve wrong data, can misinterpret things, can follow an inappropriate algorithm (=SOP) etc. Just because the system "pilot" may react sometimes in an unpredictable way is no reason to not include it in the analysis.
We have learned a lot about human factors in the last 20 years, but aircraft design still uses the same man-machine-interfaces like 50 years ago. Some >30 year old design (Airbus A320) is "modern" compared to many other aircraft still being built...