Originally Posted by
rmac2
Yes Boeing did screw up with their design concept...
BUT after reading a lot of the to and fro here I have only three words to offer for when it's all going south on the panel
PITCH
POWER
TRIM
If she won't trim to the attitude you need for the known power setting that's a pretty BIG clue which system is not playing ball, particularly in day VMC which was the conditions for both accidents
Since Pontius was a pilot we've had trim runaways. Smart people train for that. REALLY smart people engineer away the problem. This thread, and others, according to CGB:
1. Boeing think they're going to get the hinds whipped by 320NEO. They dust-off some old drawings and add a couple of efficient engines.
2. Pesky certification requirements identify a force feedback issue at high AOA.
3. Boeing introduce a mechanism to falsely provide that feedback (basically trimming away from the pilot's input). Let's just think about that -
a (hidden) automated mechanism that intentionally takes an aircraft out of trim. 4. Boeing don't put anything in the 'book' as they don't want to confuse pilots.
5. Crash 1.0
6. Crash 0.1 crew had something similar the day before. Jump-seat Hero sorted it (Why couldn't two crew figure the problem? Overload?)
7. Crash 0.1 crew and engineers didn't fully articulate and/or understand the issue. Did an occurrence report end-up on a Boeing database somewhere?
8. Boeing "Oh we have something called MCAS. It looks as if the logic may need a bit of tweaking but in the interim shove this extra page in your AFM."
6. US Government shutdown for 5 weeks - MCAS 2.0 is delayed.
7. Crash 2. "Hmmm, is this related?"
I don't see any point in specifically pointing fingers at a Seattle software engineer, a Government shutdown or under-trained, under-aroused crews - I see failures at numerous steps (Swiss cheese). There appears to be a lot of people/agencies who should be spending less time running around worrying about litigation and more time pulling-up their socks.