deltafox44, #2203
The 737 Max testing would have encountered and evaluated the deficient condition - how else would the shortfall be recorded. Perhaps not so for the abnormal drills.
An inflight failure of MCAS, in addition to being detected and managed, should not create any significant hazard as the critical flight region is at or beyond the limit of a normal flight envelope. Although I would be concerned about a GA, depending on the level of the initial, reduced thrust setting.
The safety case for using manual trim has been made in considering current failure conditions; thus MCAS unavailability should not be more frequent than those, but a ‘fix’ might not even result in the loss off trim for a system failure.
Curtain Twitcher # 2201,
Your concerns over training should be revised by reconsidering the situation if the existing system were to have been described, with the use of the ’post hoc’ abnormal drill.
MCAS training might have been a cursory acknowledgement of the system and that its operation will not intrude on normal flight conditions. The abnormal procedure ticked off by the existing runaway trim drill and continued flight without trim. Discussion of inadequacy might only arise after ‘the first incident’.
In this my concern, even with a ‘fix’, would be more about the assumptions for runaway trim, pilot identification, the crews’ ability to manage the stick forces, and to physically move the trim wheel.