The bigger picture here is the (lack of) training. Training is perceived as expensive by operators, to be minimised by the accountants and finance types. The reason we have the MAX and not the 7x7 narrowbody is because of (non)-training. Training has progressively been hacked back to the absolute bare minimum to pass the course. There are less and less descriptions in the manual of systems operations, limitations have been reduced to the colour coding on the instruments. In short, commercial pressures (perceived or real) have reduced pilots to mere SOP system operators. From the accountants perspective, all problems have been solved by the aircraft manufactures, and grudging concede we just need the absolute lowest level carbon based AI automons to read the checklist and follow SOP, to the letter if something goes wrong.
To accountants, flying aeroplanes is a "settled science", and therefore training and employment conditions are the subject to round after round of continuous cuts and we still have a "NEW" 1967 aircraft rolling off the production line with all the human factor issues baked in from another era extending well into the future. They have failed to accept the QRH introduction that states the assumption behind the checklist is that only one thing will go wrong at a time, and do not consider multiple failures.
AF447,
Air Asia 8501 TransAsia Airways Flight 235 as well as a string of
Adam Air incidents & accidents all have their genesis in the minimum training philosophy. Unfortunately, the trend is likely to continue until the industry wakes up to the fact that cutting training to the bone is NOT a competitive advantage.