Originally Posted by
gums
Salute!
Thanks, infrequent, good post about previous flight; And I would not trust all what is being bandied about concerning the extra set of eyes on that previous flight. Did that dude know about MCAS? I doubt it. Was he holding up to 40 or 50 pounds of a vibrating wheel? Ws he looking about to see if he could help? Probably. Was he more likely to notice the trim wheel moving more than the normal STS movement? Maybe. Maybe he was one of the Yeager, Doolittle or Lindbergh clones we have here or like Luke? "Something ain't right, R2, let's go manual!"
So I will like to see his actual interview and description of what happened.
As far as the other previous crewmembers go, I really feel they did a fatal disservice to the accident crew with their log entry. No mention of the stick shaker or turning off the stab trim motor and so forth. We won't know exactly what they did until they testify in one of the lawsuits. I am sure they won't say a word before then, and maybe the dead head troop won't either.
As with Mick, I am cutting the accident crew some slack.
Gums sends...
Gums- you are legendary
Originally Posted by
Ian W
Everything points to 'automation surprise' which occurs when automation does something you do not expect.
See
"Automation Surprise" in Aviation: Real-Time Solutions Here is the abstract:
MCAS is a 'silent mode change' of the aircraft and so too was the AoA disagree in some ways.
So had there been a warning
"AoA Disagree expect unreliable airspeed, Stick Shaker and MCAS" followed by
"MCAS TRIMMING DOWN"
There would have been no automation surprise as the crew wouldn't have been left trying to find out 'what's it doing now?' and two aircraft could have landed safely.
Indeed just these warnings may be all the software change needed.
This is one scenario that I had hypothesized about a week ago, and the subsequent reaction from some posters led to me becoming disillusioned with this forum, coupled with work commitments, I've missed 30 odd pages of posts. With last week being Cheltenham, I kept an eye out for any of their usernames to win the Gold Cup- on such high horses, surely they would have walked to victory!
At that time a multitude of 'experts' derided the idea that MCAS, since Lion Air, could be a factor- 'sure everyone knows what to do'. It's really not that simple! Some on this forum even insinuated that the first thing they'd do in any abnormal circumstance is flick the Stab Cut-Outs- sorry, what??? You've got a spectrum of warnings, stick shaker etc. and some forum experts believe they'd have performed perfectly every time? It's easy to make those statements in hindsight and fixating on one single issue- in this case MCAS. I was fed up with constant comments that just jumped to some conclusion that 'it's the crew's fault'.
Even those that use the Lion Air's previous flight crew as an example of what should be done- if this scenario was scientifically tested- I'd like to know the % of success/failure in the exact same scenario. At the minute- 50% for Lion Air- is that a success rate acceptable to the industry? Or do we need to revert to a 3 man flight deck? MCAS activation in the situation described is by and large silent automation- which is why it is dangerous.
I welcome all posts and find this forum to be an excellent place to discuss. In the spirit of following CRM best practice, let's be constructive, rather than posting spurious condescending comments- by users who expect every pilot to act like Sully, and deride any suggestion that the situation may be somewhat difficult for the crew in the given circumstances.