Originally Posted by
Sailvi767
The crew also would have been required to read the aircraft logbook and should have been fully aware of what happened on the previous flight and that it required a trim disconnect.
Have you taken the time to read the preliminary report?
One of the many serious post-flight delinquencies by the previous flight's Captain was his failure to properly document the problems encountered on his flight together with a full account of the remedial actions taken. There was no mention of the stick-shaker activation, there was no mention of having to run the Runway Stabilizer NNC and no mention of having to set the STAB TRIM switches to CUTOUT. The Captain limited his AFML write-up of defects to '
IAS and ALT Disagree shown after take off' and '
feel diff press light illuminate'. That was it!
His write up in the company's A-SHOR electronic reporting system was simply,
Airspeed unreliable and ALT disagree shown after takeoff, STS also running to the wrong direction, suspected because of speed difference, identified that CAPT instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO. Continue NNC of Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree. Decide to continue flying to CGK at FL280, landed safely runway 25L.
So the crew for the accident flight had no idea of the extent of the issues that had been encountered the night before nor how they had been handled. What they did know was that the previous flight had encountered Airspeed Unreliable and ALT DISAGREE problems, that they had encountered unusual trimming, and that they rectified those problems by running just those two relevant NNCs.
It appears that they did what you would have expected them to do. There's circumstantial evidence that the accident flight crew briefed for the possibility of encountering Airspeed Unreliable and ALT DISAGREE problems again, reviewed the Flight With Unreliable Airspeed tables and prepared a plan for dealing with the problems if they encountered them.
So maybe time to get off the accident crews' backs, huh?