Salute!
Previous rant continued:
At least one of the Chuck Yeager wannabes here pointed out lack of previous flight writeups that likely had MCAS activation prior to the 610 crash. WRONG!!! We went thru the acatual writeups and maintenance actions right here on pPrune.
- IAS disagree - alt disagree - feel difference
The FDR traces clearly showed the same things that 610 experienced at the onset, as well as the "corrective action". It showed what they did. You know, the Luke Skywalker/Yeager procedure -turn off stuff and go "manual". It worked, but they forgot to writeup the constant stick shaker. Hmmmmmmmmmm. Would that have helped the 610 crew?
The traces show that crew had instant shaker, likely GPWS warning when they did their dive just as flaps retracted, and so forth - exactly what the 610 crew experienced.
The FAA Airworthiness Directive mentioned all of the above possible indications plus stick shaker indicating that something was awry, and recommended the "runaway trim" procedure ( basically, "O.K. R2, let's go manual!")
The recognition of inadvertant AoA-related MCAS activation upon takeoff must be pre-thought and actions rehearsed, as many things are happening. WoW and shaker starts. Flaps up and nose goes down, maybe get GPWS alert, several caution indicator lights come on and trim goes nose down again a few seconds after trimming up. and so forth. To make things worse, 610 crew put flaps down and the MCAS behaved itself. uh huh. Step 2 or 3 or "x" in the stick shaker/stall warning proedure, right? Flaps back up and MCAS starts again. Are you confused now?
So I cut the 610 crew some slack, especially since the intermittent trim was not what one would expect from the tradional runawy trim emergency.
Dunno why 302 crew didn't recognize the problem, but it may have been caused by something else and may be yet another undocumented "feature" of the MAX.
Gums sends...