Originally Posted by FCeng84
While the MCAS software update developed after the Lion Air accident that is almost ready to go to the fleet will likely remove reliance on the three MCAS design assumptions listed above and thus would have greatly improved the likelihood of a safe outcome for the Ethiopian event we are left with a huge elephant in the room. After making the planned update we still must address the following:
A. How many other key points in the 737MAX safety story are based on pilot response assumptions that may not be valid?
B. How about other airplane models? Are they deemed safe based on faulting assumptions regarding pilot action?
- For instance, how may current 737 crews (all models) would not respond quickly enough to a classic stabilizer runaway that was not arrested by column cutout (i.e., pulling the call far enough)? I know this is covered in simulator sessions for 737 pilots, but is that enough?
C. Moving forward with the current status and future of commercial aviation have we gotten to the point where basic flying skills and system awareness are so low that we are at risk throughout the whole industry?
D. Can current and future pilot reaction short falls be addressed through training? If so, what kind, how much, and how often?
E. How will we know that we have achieved a sufficient industry wide level of safety?
Yes, yes, yes - excellent post. These are the real questions that need to be answered. The technical side of MCAS will be sorted as hands-on engineers are very good at that sort of thing, especially once an issue has been identified. The real problem is that we could be in Donald Rumsfeld territory (Unknown unknowns). I think it may be a slight turn-of-phrase, but FCeng84 has felt the need to use the 'assumption' word a lot. As an aviator, I've always been aware of assumptions, especially lots of them.
My view is that Boeing, FAA and probably a whole pile of other people engaged in aircraft manufacture (including my side of the Atlantic) may want to take a very close look at how their entire design, manufacture, training, introduction to passenger flying and oversight systems have evolved over the decades. This sort of thing simply should not happen on 21st century aircraft; we should have enough layers of safety such that the hole in the final, pilot's, slice of cheese is acceptably small. If the Ethiopian crash has the same flavour as Lion Air, some pretty big and incorrect assumptions have been made.