Originally Posted by
WHBM
Now those with long memories may recall another overstretched aircraft, the MD-11. That, too, got a "clever" bit of software to overcome design aspects. LSAS. Longitudinal Stability Augmentation System. Even the name sounds similar to MCAS. Did one of the onetime McDD engineers who stayed on after the Boeing takeover have anything to do with the more recent concept.
And again, those with long memories will recall that the MD-11 had a hull loss rate substantially out of kilter with norms, and was well known for ending up on its back and burned out alongside the runway on landing, exactly at the point where LSAS had been designed to kick in.
There were even discussions about it on PPRuNe at the time. One who seemed to understand its technicalities wrote "I seriously wonder if the FAA would be as accommodating now". Hmmm ...
Md-11 Lsas
The parallels to the MCAS and the design philosophy of attempting to make an airframe with errant handling characteristics manageable by using software are stunning. What is also stunning is the (1) lack of training on the MD-11 to handle related issues, and (2) the FAA's complicity in the problems.
In a nutshell *Boeing and the FAA have been here before and did not learn from their mistakes.*
As I read some of these MD-11 accident reports, and the author's comments in light of the recent Max incidents and accidents, my jaw literally dropped:
The McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Accident History