So much has been written here, a lot from some VERY learned folk of the aviation world, some of it justifiably emotive. I suppose at the end of the day we can only hope that some lessons will be learned by the industry, particularly here in North America. Although the DFDR readout is as yet not analysed it HAS been reported that the horizontal stabiliser jack-screw was found in the fully up/nose down position, just POSSIBLY suggesting that MCAS was again the culprit. So one vital lesson be learned would be that never again should a single source failure of a sensor (assuming we're talking about the Alpha vane again) be allowed to cause an aircraft to deviate from it's flightpath. Every aircraft that, as a licensed avionics engineer I've been seriously involved with, Concorde, B747-400 & 777-200/300, had very well designed systems indeed without this absurd fragility of a defective sensor, interface or wiring resulting in such a radical deviation from flight path. (MCAS not having an Alpha disagree inhibit really at best completely ABSURD). Another salient lesson HAS to be in terms of regulatory authority oversight, the FAA delegating such oversight to employees of the manufacturing company, Boeing, is really getting away from the whole idea of such oversight and is, in my opinion, inherently dangerous and certainly irresponsible. And let's all hope that never again shall such a radical design change as MCAS be implemented on any model upgrade without adequate training, including inclusion in the flying manual. Let's all hope that such lessons and more ARE learned.