Originally Posted by
FGD135
I can see what Boeing were trying to do. From their point of view, the pilots are already trained (supposedly) to deal with the situation the MCAS may bring up, so why complicate things?
If the pilots had followed the prescribed procedure for inadvertent/inappropriate/runaway stabiliser trim (a procedure which has existed for decades, across all Boeing models) then these crashes would not have occurred and the pilots would be none the wiser about MCAS.
I quite agree
and from
DaveReidUK
But what's really needed is an in-depth look at the (changed) relationship between the regulators and the industry (by no means confined to the USA).
The regulator challenge is not so much one of "them-vs-us" relationship between the FAA engineers and Boeing. It is the challenge of actually understanding the system versus the end-user. It's easy for the engineer who designs and the engineer who approves to make assumptions about the human that actually uses the product. But there doesn't seem to be much validation in the certification phase of this knowledge transfer to the pilot.
This is a lot more than just a Boeing problem. It is fundamental to the certification base among all national regulators. Words alone in a design assumption are not enough, there must be validation all the way to the user.